

The Pass-through of Minimum Wages
into US Retail Prices:
Evidence from Supermarket Scanner Data

Tobias Renkin (University of Zurich)
Claire Montialoux (CREST)
Michael Siegenthaler (ETH Zurich)

March 2018

Motivation

- ▶ **Wage stagnation** for bottom 50% in the US.
- Increasing interest for min. wages as redistributive policy.
- ▶ Large literature on efficiency costs of min. wage, but **few studies on pass-through into prices.**
- ▶ Concern that nominal wage increases offset by price ↗ among poorest households.
- ▶ Literature on price pass-through has focused on restaurants, but ~ small share of household expenditures.
- Our paper brings **new evidence on price pass-through of min. wage** ↗ & welfare implications **in grocery stores.**

This paper

We use **high-frequency scanner level data**

- ▶ Document price effects in **grocery stores**, in which household expenditure share is $3 \times$ larger than in restaurants. [Figures](#)
- ▶ Study **dynamics of price changes**.
- ▶ Study **heterogeneity** of price response across stores and consumers types.

We use **several research designs**

- ▶ Exploit recent changes in min. wages at the state-level.
- ▶ Consistent results in design that exploits changes in fraction of affected workers across states.

→ Our paper **moves us closer to a full understanding of price pass-through in low-wage sectors** & overall redistributive effects.

Our results

- ▶ A 10% minimum wage increase translates into a 0.2% increase in grocery stores prices.
- ▶ This is consistent with a **full-pass-through** of min. wages into prices.
- ▶ Prices increase in the three months after passage of legislation, then stabilize.
- ▶ Similar price increases faced by high-income vs. low-income households.

→ **Redistributive effects still positive for poorest households** after accounting for induced price increases.

Contribution to literature

- ▶ **Price effects** of min. wage changes

- Lit. has focused on restaurants.

- We document price effects in retail.

Card and Krueger (1995), Aaronson (2001), MacDonald and Aaronson (2006), Aaronson and French (2007), Aaronson et al. (2008), Allegretto and Reich (2018), Ganapati and Weaver (2017), Leung (2018), Ganapati and Weaver (2017).

- ▶ **Welfare implications** of min. wage changes

- Quantifies welfare effects of min. wage \nearrow after accounting for full-pass-through into prices.

Harasztosi and Lindner (2017), MaCurdy (2015).

- ▶ **Firms behavior in terms of price setting**

- Min. wage \nearrow offers clearly identified future cost shocks.

- Provides micro-evidence on firms price setting.

Gali and Gertler (1999), Mavroeidis et al. (2014).

Outline

1. Data and empirical strategy
2. Main results and robustness checks
3. Interpretation of the magnitude of the price response
4. Heterogeneity across households
5. Welfare implications
6. Conclusion

Data and empirical strategy


A new minimum wage database

We build a new database on minimum wage changes in the US

- ▶ We collect information on minimum wage changes at the federal and state level.
- ▶ We collect **legislation dates** for every min. wage increase, on top of implementation dates.
 - Firms may act in anticipation of future cost increases if presence of nominal frictions.

→ Allow us to study **dynamics of price response around time of legislation & implementation.**

Example of minimum wage increase: Illinois, 2003–2005



→ As in Illinois, **most min. wage laws schedule step-wise** ↗.

High-frequency scanner level data

We use **point-of-sale scanner data** from IRI Symphony

- ▶ Provides weekly revenues and quantities for unique products.
 - Information on $\sim 60,000$ products (UPC) grouped in 31 categories (e.g. packaged food, personal care products, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, dairy, etc.).
 - $\sim 3,000$ stores located in 41 states and 530 counties.
 - Spans Jan. 2001-Dec 2012.
- ▶ Large panel of households linked to store-level information.
 - Allow us to investigate welfare implications of price \nearrow .

→ **Price indices at store level** rather than product level bc wages are determined at store level.

We build a Laspeyres price index at store level

Step 1. We determine **monthly regular** (= nonsale) **prices**.

→ We focus on permanent price changes due to min. wage ↗.

→ Our results hold even if we do not use regular prices.

Step 2. We build price index for product i in category c in store j :

$$I_{j,t,c} = \prod_{i \in S_{j,c}} \left(\frac{P_{i,j,t}}{P_{i,j,t-1}} \right)^{\omega_{i,y(t)}}$$

Step 3. We then aggregate price changes across product categories to get a single index for each store j :

$$I_{j,t} = \prod_c I_{j,t,c}^{\omega_{c,y(t)}} \text{ and } \pi_{j,t} = \log I_{j,t}$$

→ Consumption basket in each store updated every year (weights $\omega_{i,y(t)}$ = yearly rev.) to allow for changes in shopping behavior.

Main empirical specification

$$\pi_{j,t} = \delta_j + \phi_t + \sum_{r=-k}^k \alpha_r \Delta \log_{s(j),t-r} + \sum_{r=-k}^k \beta_r \Delta mw_{s(j),t-r} + \gamma X_{j,t} + \epsilon_{j,t}$$

- ▶ $\pi_{j,t}$: monthly inflation rate in store j .
→ Inflation rather than price level bc both price levels and min. wage changes are non-stationary.
 - ▶ $\Delta \log$ and Δmw : log min. wage ↗ around legislation & implementation dates.
 - ▶ α_r, β_r : min. wage elasticities of prices r months from event.
- We ultimately care about changes in **price levels**, and compute cumulative elasticities (e.g. $E_R^{leg} = \sum_{r=-1}^R \alpha_r$).
- We estimate α and β jointly to take into account that effects at leg. and impl. dates may capture same price change.

Identification assumption

Absent min. wage \nearrow , inflation in stores in states that had a min. wage \nearrow would have evolved as inflation in states that did not have min. wage \nearrow .


- ▶ **Conditional on a set of controls and fixed effects.**
 - Inclusion of county-level unemp. rate and state-level house price growth.
 - Inclusion of time and store fixed effects → effectively controls for trends in stores' price levels in our setting.
- ▶ Identification comes from **variation in min. wage across states and time & from var. in size of min. wage \nearrow .**

States

Time

Main results and robustness checks

Price elasticity around legislated min. wage increase



→ The price elasticity wrt to min. wage increase is ~ 0.2 .

→ Similar elasticity around implementation date. [graph](#)


Potential threats to identification strategy

- ▶ **1.** Inflation may cause min. wage increases
 - Timing of effects not consistent with reverse causality.
 - No \neq between response to federal and state-level hikes.
 - Consistent results when using alternative design exploiting differences across high-wage vs. low-wage counties.

- ▶ **2.** Prices and min. wages ↗ may follow same seasonal pattern
 - Inclusion of time fixed effects in main specification.
 - We check that our results are robust to inclusion of state \times month fixed effects.

→ We conduct **series of robustness checks** to verify that our results are not driven by these threats.

Price response to state and federal min. wage increases



→ No \neq between response to federal (\sim proxy for exogenous \nearrow) and state-level hikes → **no evidence of reverse causality.**

Alternative design to study price response

Use **geographical variation in bite of min. wage increases**

- ▶ Compare evolution of prices in counties where min. wage is highly binding (= low-wage counties) to counties where min. wage is less binding (= high-wage counties).
- ▶ Identification comes from variation in initial wages across counties, size of min. wage ↗ fixed.

$$\pi_{j,q} = \delta_j + \phi_{s(j),q} + \sum_{r=-k}^k \gamma_r \Delta \log_{s(j),q-r} \times \overline{W}_{c(j),q-r} + \epsilon_{j,q}$$

→ We absorb state-quarter variation in inflation to further control for potential reverse causality.

Results using alternative design to study price response

	Baseline
$wage_q \times \Delta leg_{q-1}$	-0.012 (0.010)
$wage_q \times \Delta leg_q$	-0.028** (0.014)
$wage_q \times \Delta leg_{q+1}$	0.003 (0.013)
Observations	84,741
Controls	Y
Store FE	Y
State time FE	Y

→ Stores in high-wage counties experience *lower* inflation than stores in low-wage counties.

→ Consistent with expectations → **no evidence of reverse causality.** [More results](#)

Main results and robustness checks

Dep. variable: Store inflation	Separate estimation						Joint estimation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Legislation	0.021*** (0.007)	0.014** (0.006)	0.013*** (0.004)				0.019*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.015** (0.006)
Implementation				0.011 (0.011)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.016 (0.013)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.008)
\sum Pre-event	-0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.010)	0.003 (0.008)	0.025* (0.014)	0.008 (0.009)	0.010 (0.007)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)
<i>N</i>	191568	191568	190768	191568	191568	190768	191568	191568	190768
Division time FE	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Chain time FE	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES

→ Price elasticities measured 4 months after min. wage increase.

→ Baseline estimates **robust to** separate estimations and **restrictive set of fixed effects**.

Legisl.

Legisl. FE

Impl.

Joint

Additional results on heterogeneity of price response

Heterogeneity across stores types

- Larger effects in cheaper and larger stores Cheap vs. exp. stores
- Larger effects in larger stores Stores size
- Larger effects in smaller and regional chains of stores Chains

Heterogeneity across type of min. wage increase

- No effects for legislative events with long time to first Timing

Interpretation of the magnitude of the price
response

Theory: the elasticity of marginal cost wrt min. wage

Question: is our estimated price elasticity consistent with a full pass-through of the minimum wage?

We derive **elasticity of marginal cost wrt min. wage** in a model w/ Cobb-Douglas production, CES demand & monopolistic competition in product and labor markets:

$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial \ln MC}{\partial \ln MW}}_{\substack{\text{Elasticity of marginal} \\ \text{cost wrt min. wage} \\ \approx .02 \\ \text{(from baseline reg.)}}} = \underbrace{\frac{\overline{WL}}{C}}_{\substack{\text{Labor share} \\ \text{in cost} \\ \approx .16}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\partial \ln \overline{W}}{\partial \ln MW}}_{\substack{\text{Avg. wage elasticity} \\ \text{wrt min. wage} \\ \approx .11}} + \underbrace{\frac{P_Q Q}{C} \cdot \frac{\partial \ln P_Q}{\partial \ln MW}}_{\substack{\text{Change in wholesale} \\ \text{price of tradables} \\ \approx 0 \text{ (absorbed in FE)}}$$

$\underbrace{\hspace{15em}}_{\approx .02}$

→ The elasticity of marginal cost wrt min. wage can be decomposed into 3 components that we can empirically calibrate.

Effects on output

Demand or Supply?

Labor share

From theory to empirical calibrations (1/2)

We estimate the **labor share in grocery stores' cost** using Economic Census data and Annual Retail Trade Surveys:

	Variable Cost			Fixed Cost
	Labor	COGS	Other	
Share in Total Cost	14.7	75.1	0.6	9.7
Share in Variable Cost	16.3	83.1	0.7	NA

→ The labor share in grocery stores' cost $\approx .16$.

From theory to empirical calibrations (2/2)

We estimate the **elasticity of avg. wage wrt min. wage** using Quarterly Census Employment and Wages data:

Dep. variable: log avg. earnings	Retail trade		Grocery stores		Acc. and food services	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
log minimum wage	0.048* (0.026)	0.038 (0.024)	0.108** (0.043)	0.083*** (0.027)	0.151*** (0.024)	0.147*** (0.025)
N	124,000	124,000	80,722	80,759	98,056	98,080
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Linear state trends	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

→ The elasticity of avg. wage wrt min. wage is ≈ 0.11 .

Is our price elasticity consistent with a full pass-through?

We derive the **pass-through formula** as:

$$\text{Pass-through} = \frac{\text{Price elasticity wrt min. wage}}{\text{Labor cost share} \times \text{Avg. wage elast. wrt min. wage}}$$

	(1) Baseline	(2) Region-time FE	(3) Chain-time FE
	Pass-through at legislation		
Pass-through	1.103	1.171	0.843
p-value PT = 1	0.780	0.531	0.651

→ We cannot reject pass-through = 1 for any specification.

→ Our estimated price elasticity is **consistent with a full pass-through**.

Heterogeneity across households

Heterogeneity of price response across households

We define **low-income** (<25K annual income), **medium-** (25K–75K) **and high-income** (>75K) households.

Dep. variable: Store inflation w. different weights	Separate estimation						Joint estimation		
	(1) Low	(2) Medium	(3) High	(4) Low	(5) Medium	(6) High	(7) Low	(8) Medium	(9) High
Legislation	0.013** (0.005)	0.013** (0.006)	0.014*** (0.005)				0.021*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.006)
Implementation				0.009 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)	0.006 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.011)
Σ Pre-Event	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.005 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.017)
<i>N</i>	146815	146739	146739	146739	146739	146739	146739	146739	146739

- **No \neq in price response across households.**
- But grocery expenditures share varies across households.
 - Welfare implications?

Welfare implications

Welfare implications of price increases in grocery stores

We compute **equivalent variation** of hypothetical 20% min. wage increase for each household income category j :

$$\Delta U_j = \underbrace{\Delta Y_j}_{\substack{\text{Increase in} \\ \text{nominal wage gains} \\ = \mathbf{Benefits}}} - \underbrace{E_j \Delta P_j}_{\substack{\text{Offset by} \\ \text{price increases} \\ = \mathbf{Costs}}}$$


Benefits of nominal wage gains

- Predicted using Current Population Survey.
- Assumes no change in hours or employment.
- Assumes spillover effects up to 130% of old min. wage.

Costs of price increases


- E_j = grocery exp. from Consumer Expenditure Survey.

Welfare cost of price increase (% of household income)



→ Price \nearrow in grocery stores due to 20% min. wage \nearrow cost \sim .2% of annual income among poorest households (<10K).

Welfare implications of price increases in grocery stores



→ Price ↗ offset up to 10% of income for poorest hh (<10K).

→ **Redistributive effects still positive among poorest** after accounting for price ↗ in restaurants as well. Including restaurants

Conclusion

Consumers bear the cost of the min. wage.

- ▶ A 10% minimum wage increase translates into a 0.2% increase in grocery stores prices.
- ▶ Consistent with a **full-pass-through** of min. wages into prices.

Similar price increases for products bought by **high-income vs. low-income households.**

Redistributive effects still positive for poorest households after accounting for induced price increases.

Appendix


Labor share in grocery stores' cost [Back](#)

	Variable Cost			Fixed Cost
	Labor	COGS	Other	
Share in Total Cost	14.7	75.1	0.6	9.7
Share in Variable Cost	16.3	83.1	0.7	NA

Data: Balance sheets for grocery store sector, Annual Retail Trade Survey (Census Bureau)

- ▶ Labor cost is the second most important factor
- ▶ Most important factor for grocery stores are COGS
- ▶ Data available only at national sector level every 5 years

State and federal legislation [Back](#)



- ▶ Federal legislation affects states w/o higher state-level MW
 - ▶ Treatment more likely independent of **local** inflation
- ⇒ Reverse causality of state level legislation is not an issue

Identification within states [Back](#)

- ▶ MW increase less binding in counties with higher initial wage
- ▶ Identification through variation in wage, keeping MW increase fixed
- ▶ Expect negative relationship:
higher wage \implies MW increase less binding

$$\pi_{j,q} = \delta_j + \phi_{s(j),q} + \sum_{r=-k}^k \gamma_r \Delta \text{leg}_{s(j),q-r} \times \overline{W}_{c(j),q-r} + \epsilon_{j,q}$$

- ▶ Allows to absorb state-quarter variation
 - ▶ Differences in average state inflation at any time
 - ▶ Differences in legislators' inflation expectations at any time

Identification within states [Back](#)

Dep. variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Store inflation	Baseline	Chain-time	Baseline	Chain-time
Legislation				
$wage_q \times \Delta leg_{q-1}$	-0.012 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)		
$wage_q \times \Delta leg_q$	-0.028** (0.014)	-0.031** (0.013)		
$wage_q \times \Delta leg_{q+1}$	0.003 (0.013)	0.004 (0.010)		
Implementation				
$wage_{q-2} \times \Delta mw_{q-1}$			-0.026 (0.035)	-0.006 (0.028)
$wage_{q-2} \times \Delta mw_q$			0.012 (0.035)	0.036 (0.023)
$wage_{q-2} \times \Delta mw_{q+1}$			-0.016 (0.028)	0.010 (0.025)
Estimation Summary				
Observations	84741	84503	84748	84512
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Store FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
State time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Chain time FE	NO	YES	NO	YES

Store level price indices [Back](#)

Index construction similar to Stroebel and Vavra (2015):

1. Determine weekly regular (nonsale) price using Kehoe and Midrigan (2015) algorithm
2. Index over price changes for store j , category c

$$I_{j,t,c} = \prod_{i \in S_{j,c}} \left(\frac{P_{i,j,t}}{P_{i,j,t-1}} \right)^{\omega_{i,y(t)}}$$

3. Aggregate category indices to single index for store j :


$$I_{j,t} = \prod_c I_{j,t,c}^{\omega_{c,y(t)}} \text{ and } \pi_{j,t} = \log I_{j,t}$$

4. Yearly revenues as weights in both steps


Why grocery stores?

1. Grocery stores employ many MW workers
2. Groceries cover a large share of consumer expenditure

(1) Wage distribution



(2) Expenditure share



Share of MW workers (in %) [Back](#)

% of MW cutoff	in employment		in hours		in earnings	
	≤ 110%	≤ 130%	≤ 110%	≤ 130%	≤ 110%	≤ 130%
2001 - 2005						
Grocery Stores	12.1	29.6	9.0	23.0	4.5	13.1
Other sectors	4.0	8.5	3.1	6.8	0.9	2.3
2006 - 2009						
Grocery Stores	20.7	38.8	16.1	31.4	8.9	19.0
Other sectors	5.2	11.1	4.1	9.0	1.2	3.2
2010 - 2012						
Grocery Stores	25.1	48.8	19.2	40.3	11.1	25.4
Other sectors	6.5	14.7	5.1	12.0	1.6	4.4

- ▶ Data: CPS MORG
- ▶ Share of workers with avg. hourly earnings below cutoff, averaged over states


Expenditure shares for grocery products (in %) [Back](#)

	All households	Poorest quintile	2nd quintile	3rd quintile	4th quintile	Richest quintile
2001 - 2005	11.1	15.3	13.6	12.1	11.1	9.1
2006 - 2009	10.7	14.3	12.7	11.4	10.7	9.0
2010 - 2012	11.0	14.4	12.8	11.6	10.8	9.4

- ▶ Data: CES
- ▶ Grocery products include “food at home”, “household supplies”, “personal care products”, “alcoholic beverages” categories

Saliency of minimum wage legislation [Back](#)


Google Search volume for “minimum wage + *statename_s*”




$$\log search_{s,t} = \delta_s + \gamma_t + \sum_{r=-k}^k \beta_r incr_{s,t-r} + \sum_{r=-k}^k \alpha_r legis_{s,t-r} + \epsilon_{s,t}$$

Distribution over time [Back](#)

(a) MW Legislation



(b) MW increase




- ▶ 62 legislative events
- ▶ 166 MW increases
- ▶ Many events follow from 2007 federal MW increase

Summary statistics [Back](#)

	MW hikes		MW legislation	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Log size	0.08	(0.05)	0.20	(0.12)
Events per state	4.05	(1.97)	1.51	(0.75)
Months to last event	13.86	(7.03)	23.32	(16.76)
Months hike to legislation / legislation to first hike	15.65	(9.82)	8.74	(8.01)
Share federal hike	0.36	(0.48)	0.42	(0.50)
Share indexed hike	0.24	(0.43)		
Share 2001–2005	0.16	(0.37)	0.24	(0.43)
Share 2006–2008	0.54	(0.50)	0.74	(0.44)
Share 2009–2012	0.30	(0.46)	0.016	(0.13)
Share January	0.46	(0.50)	0.45	(0.50)
Share July	0.43	(0.50)	0.048	(0.22)
Number of Events	166		62	

Price elasticity around implemented min. wage increase



→ Price elasticity around implementation date ~ 0.2 . [Back](#)


Results using alternative design [Back](#)

Dep. variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Store inflation	Baseline	Chain-time	Baseline	Chain-time
Legislation				
$wage_q \times \Delta leg_{q-1}$	-0.012 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)		
$wage_q \times \Delta leg_q$	-0.028** (0.014)	-0.031** (0.013)		
$wage_q \times \Delta leg_{q+1}$	0.003 (0.013)	0.004 (0.010)		
Implementation				
$wage_{q-2} \times \Delta mw_{q-1}$			-0.026 (0.035)	-0.006 (0.028)
$wage_{q-2} \times \Delta mw_q$			0.012 (0.035)	0.036 (0.023)
$wage_{q-2} \times \Delta mw_{q+1}$			-0.016 (0.028)	0.010 (0.025)
Estimation Summary				
Observations	84741	84503	84748	84512
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Store FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
State time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Chain time FE	NO	YES	NO	YES


Robustness checks for effects at legislation [Back](#)

Dep. variable: Store inflation	(1) Weighted	(2) No Controls	(3) No store FE	(4) Seasonal	(5) No salesfilter	(6) Winsorized
Legislation						
E_0^{leg}	0.009** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.009*** (0.003)
E_2^{leg}	0.016*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.007)	0.014*** (0.004)
E_4^{leg}	0.022*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.008)	0.019*** (0.006)
Estimation Summary						
\sum All	0.022* (0.013)	0.019 (0.016)	0.021 (0.018)	0.018 (0.016)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)
\sum Pre-event	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.014 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.006)
<i>N</i>	191568	191641	191568	191568	191568	191568
Controls	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Store FE	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Seasonality	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Weights	Obs	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO


Price pass-through around min. wage legislation [Back](#)



Prices around MW implementation



(a) Baseline



(b) Chain-time or region-time FE

Robustness checks for joint estimates [Back](#)

Dep. variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Store inflation	Weighted	No Controls	No Store FE	Seasonal	No Salesfilter	Winsorized
Legislation						
E_0^{leg}	0.008** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.010*** (0.002)
E_2^{leg}	0.014*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.026*** (0.009)	0.013*** (0.004)
E_4^{leg}	0.019*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.017*** (0.005)
Implementation						
E_0^{inc}	0.008 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.003 (0.006)
E_2^{inc}	0.016 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.011 (0.012)	0.011 (0.011)	0.013 (0.009)	0.012 (0.011)
E_4^{inc}	0.024* (0.013)	0.017 (0.013)	0.015 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.022* (0.011)	0.015 (0.012)
Estimation Summary						
$E_4^{leg} + E_4^{inc}$	0.042*** (0.015)	0.036** (0.014)	0.036** (0.016)	0.037** (0.014)	0.053*** (0.015)	0.033** (0.013)
\sum All	0.058*** (0.020)	0.046* (0.024)	0.046 (0.028)	0.046* (0.025)	0.041 (0.027)	0.040* (0.021)
\sum Pre-event	0.014 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	0.008 (0.018)	0.008 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.018)	0.004 (0.014)
N	191568	191641	191568	191568	191568	191568
Controls	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Store FE	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Seasonality	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Weights	Obs	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

Results by chain type [Back](#)

Dep. variable: Store inflation	(1) Small Chain	(2) Regional Chain	(3) Large Chain	(4) National Chain
Legislation				
E_0^{leg}	0.011*** (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006* (0.004)
E_2^{leg}	0.018*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.007* (0.004)	0.008 (0.006)
E_4^{leg}	0.018*** (0.006)	0.016** (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)	0.009 (0.008)
Implementation				
E_0^{inc}	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.009)
E_2^{inc}	0.006 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.009)
E_4^{inc}	0.013 (0.008)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.012)
Estimation Summary				
$E_4^{leg} + E_4^{inc}$	0.031** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	0.001 (0.012)	0.003 (0.016)
\sum All	0.037** (0.018)	0.037* (0.020)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.019)
\sum Pre-event	0.007 (0.007)	0.012 (0.009)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.011)
N	108336	131959	98141	74518
controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Store FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Division time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Results by store size [Back](#)


Dep. variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Store inflation	Small (revenue)	Small (prod. range)	Large (revenue)	Large (prod. range)
Legislation				
E_0^{leg}	0.015*** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.007** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)
E_2^{leg}	0.013** (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)
E_4^{leg}	0.006 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.006)
Implementation				
E_0^{inc}	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
E_2^{inc}	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
E_4^{inc}	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.015 (0.010)	0.013 (0.009)
Estimation Summary				
$E_4^{leg} + E_4^{inc}$	-0.000 (0.011)	0.001 (0.012)	0.034** (0.013)	0.035*** (0.013)
\sum All	0.001 (0.015)	0.000 (0.018)	0.042* (0.022)	0.047** (0.021)
\sum Pre-event	0.011* (0.006)	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)
N	95077	103473	111400	103004
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Store FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Division time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Results by store price level [Back](#)


Dep. variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Store inflation	Cheap (state)	Cheap (county)	Expensive (state)	Expensive (county)
Legislation				
E_0^{leg}	0.012*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)
E_2^{leg}	0.015*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.008 (0.007)	0.004 (0.009)
E_4^{leg}	0.014*** (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)	0.008 (0.009)	0.013 (0.009)
Implementation				
E_0^{inc}	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)
E_2^{inc}	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.011)
E_4^{inc}	0.007 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.012 (0.010)	0.005 (0.014)
Estimation Summary				
$E_4^{leg} + E_4^{inc}$	0.021** (0.010)	0.023** (0.010)	0.020 (0.013)	0.018 (0.017)
\sum All	0.024 (0.016)	0.034* (0.017)	0.046** (0.022)	0.037 (0.032)
\sum Pre-event	0.005 (0.007)	0.015* (0.008)	0.030** (0.013)	0.018 (0.017)
N	155518	126557	50959	32658
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Store FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Division time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Results by timing [Back](#)

(a) at legislation



(b) at implementation



- ▶ (a) time from legislation to first hike \leq 9 months
- ▶ (b) time from corresponding legislation to hike \leq 9 months

Effects on output and revenues [Back](#)


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Quantity index	Log revenues	Quantity index	Log revenues	Quantity index	Log revenues
Legislation	-0.039 (0.045)	0.001 (0.041)			-0.033 (0.045)	-0.014 (0.047)
Implementation			-0.056 (0.055)	-0.044 (0.056)	-0.041 (0.064)	-0.020 (0.067)
Σ Pre-event	-0.012 (0.035)	-0.054 (0.036)	-0.084 (0.059)	-0.018 (0.066)	-0.022 (0.068)	-0.024 (0.074)
<i>N</i>	201973	201578	201973	201578	201973	201578

- ▶ Cumulative elasticity 4 months after event
- ▶ No significant effects on output or revenues
- ▶ Potentially a problem of precision, negative point estimates

Demand or supply? [Back](#)


- ▶ We view minimum wage shocks as a cost shock
- ▶ Minimum wages may shift market demand for groceries
- ▶ This is unlikely to drive our results:
 1. The income elasticity of most groceries is substantially below one
 2. Literature finds no effects of MW increases on expenditures on non-durables even for HH with MW income
Aaronson et al. (2012)
 3. Many workers but few customers earn MW. Moreover, these customers spend little because they are poor
 4. Grocery prices respond little even to larger demand shocks
Gagnon and Lopez-Salido (2014), Loupias and Sevestre (2013)

Relative to nominal gains including restaurants [Back](#)




Frequency of price increases and decreases [Back](#)

(a) Increases



(b) Decreases



- Aaronson, Daniel**, “Price pass-through and the minimum wage,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2001, 83 (1), 158–169.
- **and Eric French**, “Product Market Evidence on the Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage,” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 2007, 25 (1), 167–200.
- , — , **and James MacDonald**, “The Minimum Wage, Restaurant Prices, and Labor Market Structure,” *Journal of Human Resources*, 2008, 43 (3), 688–720.
- , **Sumit Agarwal, and Eric French**, “The Spending and Debt Response to Minimum Wage Hikes,” *American Economic Review*, 2012, 102 (7), 3111–3139.
- Allegretto, Sylvia and Michael Reich**, “Are Local Minimum Wages Absorbed by Price Increases? Estimates from Internet-Based Restaurant Menus,” *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 2018, 71 (1).
- Card, David and Alan B. Krueger**, *Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Gagnon, Etienne and David Lopez-Salido, “Small Price Responses to Large Demand Shocks,” *Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series*, 2014.

Gali, Jordi and Mark Gertler, “Inflation dynamics: A structural econometric analysis,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 1999, 44.

Harasztosi, Péter and Attila Lindner, “Who Pays for the Minimum Wage?,” *Unpublished manuscript*, 2017.

Kehoe, Patrick J. and Virgiliu Midrigan, “Prices Are Sticky After All,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, October 2015, 75.

Loupias, Claire and Patrick Sevestre, “Costs, Demand, and Producer Price Changes,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, March 2013, 95 (1).

MacDonald, James M. and Daniel Aaronson, “How Firms Construct Price Changes: Evidence from Restaurant Responses to Increased Minimum Wages,” *Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 2006, 88 (2), 292–307.

MaCurdy, Thomas, “How Effective Is the Minimum Wage at Supporting the Poor?,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 2015, 123 (2), 497–545.

Mavroeidis, Sophocles, Mikkel Plagborg-Møller, and James H. Stock, “Empirical Evidence on Inflation Expectations in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 2014, 52 (1).

Stroebel, Johannes and Joseph Vavra, “House Prices, Local Demand, and Retail Prices,” *Working Paper*, August 2015.