
Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality

Ellora Derenoncourt (UC Berkeley)
Claire Montialoux (UC Berkeley)


August 31, 2020

White-Black Earnings Gap




Persistence of large racial economic disparities: striking dimension of inequality in the US.

White-Black Earnings Gap



Racial earnings gap fell only once since 1950: in 1960s and 1970s.

White-Black Earnings Gap



Why did the racial gap fall in 1960s and 1970s? Key to understand what policies could \searrow racial gap today.

A new explanation

New explanation for racial gap \searrow during Civil Rights Era: introduction of min. wage in new sectors of the economy.

- ▶ 1938 federal min wage excluded a number of sectors where black workers over-represented.
- ▶ 1967: min. wage introduced in agriculture, hotels, restaurants, schools, hospitals, nursing homes & other services.
- ▶ Newly covered sectors employed 1/3 of all US black workers.
- ▶ 1967 reform can explain \sim 20% decline in racial gap in late '60s & early '70s.
- \rightarrow We uncover critical role of min. wage in dynamics of racial inequality.

Empirical challenges

Two challenges to identify role of 1967 extension of min. wage in reduction of racial inequality:

- Difficulty in identifying causal effect in context of other policy changes during Civil Rights Era.
- Lack of data on hourly wages in the 1960s.
- ightarrow We overcome these challenges by using a variety of research designs and unearthing a **new data source** on hourly wages.

A new data source

Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Industry Wage Reports

- Distribution of hourly wages.
- ▶ By fine industry \times year \times region \times gender \times occupation.
- ▶ We digitize $\sim 1,000$ distributions. ▶ List of ind.

Laundry and Cleaning Services
Mid-1966

Bulletin No. 1544

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS



 \rightarrow Regular BLS industry wage reports from the 1930s to the 1970s.

Laundry and Cleaning Services

Bulletin No. 1544

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

UREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS



→ Rich source of data: can be used to study gender inequality, regional convergence, rural-urban gap, wage-price inflation, wage vs. non-wage compensation, etc.

Laundry and Cleaning Services

Mid-1966

Bulletin No. 1544

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS



| industry | year | region | avg_hourly_wages | number |
|-----------|------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
| laundries | 1966 | us | Under \$0.75 | 13,623 |
| laundries | 1966 | us | \$0.75 and under \$0.80 | 6,812 |
| laundries | 1966 | us | \$0.80 and under \$0.85 | 8,050 |
| laundries | 1966 | s | Under \$0.75 | 13,182 |
| laundries | 1966 | s | \$0.75 and under \$0.80 | 5,961 |

Laundry and Cleaning Services

Mid 1966

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Table 3. Earnings Distribution: All Areas-Women


| | τ | Jnited States | | South | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| Average hourly earnings 1 | Total | Inside plant workers | Office workers | Total | inside plant workers | Office workers |
| Under \$0.75 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 0.5 | 11.5 | 11.9 | 1.8 |
| \$0.75 and under \$0.80 \$0.80 and under \$0.85 \$0.85 and under \$0.90 \$0.90 and under \$0.95 \$0.95 and under \$1.00 | 2. 2 2. 6 2. 6 2. 4 1. 8 | 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.6 1.8 | . 2 . 5 . 3 . 4 . 2 | 5. 2 6. 4 6. 3 5. 4 4. 3 | 5.4 6.6 6.6 5.5 4.4 | .3 1.4 .6 1.4 |
| \$3.00 and over | .4 | < > .4 | 1.3 | < » | ,1 | < } . 8 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Number of workers | 309,624 | 292, 145 | 17,479 | 114,628 | 109,592 | 5,036 |
| Average hourly earnings 1 | \$1.33 | \$1.31 | \$1.68 | \$1.08 | \$1.06 | \$1.47 |

| industry | year | region | avg_hourly_wages | number |
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
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| Average hourly earnings 1 | Total | Inside plant workers | Office workers | Total | Inside plant workers | Office workers | |
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| \$0.85 and under \$0.90 \$0.90 and under \$0.95 | 2.6 2.4 | 2.7 2.6 | .3 | 6.3 5.4 | 6.6 5.5 | .6 1.4 | |
| \$0.95 and under \$1.00 | 1.8 | 1.8 | .2 <} | ↓ 4.3 <> | 4,4 <> | } <} | |
| \$3.00 and over | .4 | . 4 | 1.3 | 1 | .1 | 8 | |
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
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
 \rightarrow Low-wage industry: 70% of workers paid at or below \$1.



Hourly wage distrib. shifted to the right from 1963 to 1966. \rightarrow reflects nominal wage growth.



In 1967, the min. wage is introduced at \$1 in laundries.



- \rightarrow Large spike at \$1 in 1967.
- \rightarrow Clear evidence of how 1967 reform affected wages & emp.

A new data source

Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Industry Wage Reports

- Distribution of hourly wages.
- ▶ By fine industry \times year \times region \times gender \times occupation.
- ▶ We digitize $\sim 1,000$ distributions. ▶ List of ind.
- ightarrow Provides clear evidence of how 1967 reform affected distribution of wages & employment.

A new data source

Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Industry Wage Reports

- Distribution of hourly wages.
- ▶ By fine industry \times year \times region \times gender \times occupation.
- ▶ We digitize $\sim 1,000$ distributions. ▶ List of ind.
- ightarrow Provides clear evidence of how 1967 reform affected distribution of wages & employment. Combine with **March**

Current Population Survey (CPS)

- ▶ Individual characteristics (e.g., education).
- Information on race.
- → Allows us to study heterogeneity of the effect, most importantly across racial groups.

 → map

Research designs

Earnings

- Industry difference-in-differences (newly covered vs. previously covered industries).
- \blacktriangleright Sharp increase in earnings, twice as large for black workers ($\sim 10\%$) as for whites.

Employment

- "Bunching" estimator (compare bunching at new min. wage to # workers below min wage pre-reform).
- Consistent results in cross-state design (strongly vs. weakly treated states).
- No evidence of large disemployment effect.
- \rightarrow Decline in racial earnings gap translates into decline in racial income gap.

Contribution to literature

Racial Inequality: What caused \searrow in racial gap?

- ▶ **Demand factors**: Anti-discrimination policies. Freeman, 1973; Welch, 1973; Smith and Welch, 1976; Haworth et al., 1977; Donohue and Heckman, 1991.
- ▶ Supply factors ($\sim 50\%$): \nearrow in schooling and transfers. Butler and Heckman, 1977; Brown, 1984; Smith and Welch, 1986 & 1989; Card and Krueger, 1992 & 1993; Johnson 2016.



Contribution to literature

Racial Inequality: What caused \searrow in racial gap?

- ▶ **Demand factors** ($\sim 30\%$): Anti-discrimination policies. Freeman, 1973; Welch, 1973; Smith and Welch, 1976; Haworth et al., 1977; Donohue and Heckman, 1991.
- ► Supply factors (~ 50%): ✓ in schooling and transfers.

 Butler and Heckman, 1977; Brown, 1984; Smith and Welch, 1986 & 1989; Card and Krueger, 1992 & 1993; Johnson 2016.

Minimum Wage


- Redistributive effects of min. wage DiNardo et al., 1996; Autor et al., 2016; Dube, 2019.
- ► Very large min. wage increases
 Harasztosi and Lindner, 2019; Engbom et al., 2018; Jardim et al. 2018.
- Burgeoning lit. on bunching applied to min. wage Harasztosi and Lindner, 2019; Cengiz et al., 2019.

Outline

- 1. Background on 1967 reform
- 2. Effect on earnings
- 3. Effect on employment
- 4. Effect on economy-wide racial gap
- 5. Conclusion

Background on 1967 reform

Share of workers covered by federal minimum wage



 \rightarrow Industries covered in 1967 represent \sim 20% of economy and 30% of black workers.



MARCH ON WASHINGTON FOR JOBS AND FREEDOM

AUGUST 28, 1963



WHAT WE DEMAND.

- Comprehensive and effective civil rights legislation from the present Congress—without compromise or filibuster—to guarantee all Americans
 - access to all public accommodations decent housing adequate and integrated education
 - the right to vote
- 2. Withholding of Federal funds from all programs in which discrimination exists.
 - 3. Desegregation of all school districts in 1963.
- Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment—reducing Congressional representation of states where citizens are disfranchised.
- A new Executive Order banning discrimination in all housing supported by federal funds.
- Authority for the Attorney General to institute injunctive suits when any constitutional right is violated.
- A massive federal program to train and place all unemployed workers—Negro and white—on meaningful and dignified jobs at decent wages.
- A national minimum wage act that will give all Americans a decent standard of living. (Government surveys show that anything less than \$2.00 an hour fails to do this.)
- A broadened Fair Labor Standards Act to include all areas of employment which are presently excluded.
- A federal Fair Employment Practices Act barring discrimination by federal, state and municipal governments, and by employers, contractors, employment agencies, and trade unions.
- \rightarrow 1967 reform is part of Civil Rights Movement.

[This minimum wage law] will help minority groups who are helpless in the face of prejudice that exists. (...) It will not force employers to cut down and fire employees (...) – the record doesn't show that. [This law], with its increased minimum, with its expanded coverage, will


prevent much of th[e] exploitation of the defenseless -

the workers who are in serious need.

— Lyndon B. Johnson

Remarks at the Signing of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 September 23, 1966

Federal minimum wage, \$2017



 $\rightarrow \! 1967$ intro of min. wage $\sim 35\%$ earnings \nearrow for affected workers = huge shock (\rightarrow relevant for debate on \$15 today).



Effect of 1967 reform on annual earnings

Industry diff-in-diff to study effects on earnings

$$\log w_{ijst} = \alpha + \sum_{k=-4}^{15} \beta_k \text{Covered } 1967_j \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}'_{ijst} \Gamma + \delta_j + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

- w_{ijst} : log annual earnings for individual i, industry j in state group s and year t.
- \triangleright β_k measures effect of reform k years after base year 1965.
- $Arr X_{ijst}$: individual-level controls (gender, race, exp., educ., nb of weeks & hours worked, occupation, marital status).
- ▶ δ_j and δ_t : industry and year fixed effects.
- → Identification assumption: Absent '67 reform, earnings in 1967 and in 1938 industries would have evolved similarly.
- \rightarrow Show results with CPS (consistent results with BLS).


Effect of 1967 extension of min. wage on annual earnings



 \rightarrow Immediate \nearrow in earnings in 1967 in newly treated industries relative to control industries.



Effect on earnings for high- vs. low-education workers




- → Effect concentrated among low-education workers.
- → Similar pattern among blacks ▶ Blacks and whites ▶ Whites

 \forall period $k \in [1961-1966], [1967-1972] & [1973-1980],$ $\log w_{ijst} = \alpha + \sum_{k} \beta_k \text{Covered } 1967_j \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}'_{ijst} \Gamma + \delta_j + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ijst}$

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Covered in 1967 \times | | | | | | |
| 1967-1972 | 0.065** | 0.059** | 0.056** | 0.065** | 0.063** | 0.065** |
| | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.029) |
| Obs | 407,823 | 407,823 | 401,171 | 375,393 | 407,823 | 407,823 |
| Controls | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Industry FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| State FE | N | Υ | N | N | N | N |
| State linear trends | N | Υ | N | N | N | N |
| W/o agriculture | N | N | Υ | N | N | N |
| Full-Time only | N | N | N | Υ | N | N |
| Winsorized data | N | N | N | N | Υ | N |
| 2-way clusters | N | N | N | N | N | Υ |

 \rightarrow Baseline effect on earnings pooled 1967-72: + 6.5 log points.



 $\begin{array}{l} \forall \text{ period } k \in \text{[1961-1966], [1967-1972] \& [1973-1980],} \\ \log w_{ijst} = \alpha + \sum_k \beta_k \text{Covered } 1967_j \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}'_{ijst}\Gamma + \delta_j + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ijst} \end{array}$

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| Winsorized data | N | N | N | N | Υ | N |
| 2-way clusters | N | N | N | N | N | Υ |

ightarrow Effect on earnings robust to inclusion of state linear trends.

 $\begin{array}{l} \forall \text{ period } k \in \text{[1961-1966], [1967-1972] \& [1973-1980],} \\ \log w_{ijst} = \alpha + \sum_k \beta_k \text{Covered } 1967_j \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}'_{ijst}\Gamma + \delta_j + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ijst} \end{array}$

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
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| Controls | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Industry FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| State FE | N | Υ | N | N | N | N |
| State linear trends | N | Υ | N | N | N | N |
| W/o agriculture | N | N | Υ | N | N | N |
| Full-Time only | N | N | N | Υ | N | N |
| Winsorized data | N | N | N | N | Υ | N |
| 2-way clusters | N | N | N | N | N | Υ |

 \rightarrow Effect on earnings robust to exclusion of agriculture.

$$\begin{array}{l} \forall \text{ period } k \in \text{[1961-1966], [1967-1972] \& [1973-1980],} \\ \log w_{ijst} = \alpha + \sum_k \beta_k \text{Covered } 1967_j \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}'_{ijst} \Gamma + \delta_j + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ijst} \end{array}$$

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
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| State FE | N | Υ | N | N | N | N |
| State linear trends | N | Υ | N | N | N | N |
| W/o agriculture | N | N | Υ | N | N | N |
| Full-Time only | N | N | N | Υ | N | N |
| Winsorized data | N | N | N | N | Υ | N |
| 2-way clusters | N | N | N | N | N | Υ |

 \rightarrow Effect on earnings robust to restricting sample to full-time workers and winsorizing outcome and controls at 5% level.

Effect on earnings: robustness

 $\begin{array}{l} \forall \ \mathsf{period} \ k \in \texttt{[1961-1966]}, \ \texttt{[1967-1972]} \ \& \ \texttt{[1973-1980]}, \\ \log w_{ijst} = \alpha + \sum_k \beta_k \mathsf{Covered} \ \texttt{1967}_j \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}'_{ijst} \Gamma + \delta_j + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ijst} \end{array}$

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
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| Controls | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Industry FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| State FE | N | Υ | N | N | N | N |
| State linear trends | N | Υ | N | N | N | N |
| W/o agriculture | N | N | Υ | N | N | N |
| Full-Time only | N | N | N | Υ | N | N |
| Winsorized data | N | N | N | N | Υ | N |
| 2-way clusters | N | N | N | N | N | Y |

 \rightarrow Precision unaffected by two-way clustering (industry & state).

| | (1) | (2) | $(3) = (1) \times (2)$ | (4) | |
|---|---|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| | Share of workers at or below the MW (%) | Avg increase in earnings for MW workers (%) | Predicted increase in earnings (%) | Estimated increase in earnings (%) | |
| All | 16.1 | 33.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 | |
| By education Low-education High-education | 31.1 9.6 | 32.7 34.2 | 10.2 3.3 | 10.1 2.5 | |
| <i>By race</i> Black White | 28.8 13.9 | 38.2 32.0 | 11.0 4.5 | 8.0 4.3 | |

Notes: same sample as in earnings regressions, in treated ind. in 1966. Share of mw workers = workers at or below the 1967 mw. Estimates in col. (3) and (4) are for 1967 only.

- ightarrow Assumes perfect compliance, no spillovers, no employment or GE effects, and small measurement error in hourly wage.
- \rightarrow Share of affected workers in treated industries $\sim 16\%$.

| | (1) | (2) | $(3) = (1) \times (2)$ | (4) |
|----------------|---|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Share of workers at or below the MW (%) | Avg increase in earnings for MW workers (%) | Predicted increase in earnings (%) | Estimated increase in earnings (%) |
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Notes: same sample as in earnings regressions, in treated ind. in 1966. Share of mw workers = workers at or below the 1967 mw. Estimates in col. (3) and (4) are for 1967 only.

 \rightarrow Average wage increase among affected workers \sim 35%.

| | (1) | (2) | $(3) = (1) \times (2)$ | (4) | |
|----------------|---|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| | Share of workers at or below the MW (%) | Avg increase in earnings for MW workers (%) | Predicted increase in earnings (%) | Estimated increase in earnings (%) | |
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Notes: same sample as in earnings regressions, in treated ind. in 1966. Share of mw workers = workers at or below the 1967 mw. Estimates in col. (3) and (4) are for 1967 only.

ightarrow Estimated effects on earnings consistent with predicted effects.

| | (1) | (2) | $(3) = (1) \times (2)$ | (4) |
|----------------|---|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Share of workers at or below the MW (%) | Avg increase in earnings for MW workers (%) | Predicted increase in earnings (%) | Estimated increase in earnings (%) |
| All | 16.1 | 33.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 |
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| White | 13.9 | 32.0 | 4.5 | 4.3 |

Notes: same sample as in earnings regressions, in treated ind. in 1966. Share of mw workers = workers at or below the 1967 mw. Estimates in col. (3) and (4) are for 1967 only.


- \rightarrow Estimated effects on earnings consistent with predicted effects.
- ightarrow i.e. consistent with our assumptions of perfect compliance, no spillovers, no emp. or GE effects.

| | (1) | (2) | $(3) = (1) \times (2)$ | (4) | |
|----------------|---|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| | Share of workers at or below the MW (%) | Avg increase in earnings for MW workers (%) | Predicted increase in earnings (%) | Estimated increase in earnings (%) | |
| All | 16.1 | 33.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 | |
| By education | | | | | |
| Low-education | 31.1 | 32.7 | 10.2 | 10.1 | |
| High-education | 9.6 | 34.2 | 3.3 | 2.5 | |
| By race | | | | | |
| Black | 28.8 | 38.2 | 11.0 | 8.0 | |
| White | 13.9 | 32.0 | 4.5 | 4.3 | |

Notes: same sample as in earnings regressions, in treated ind. in 1966. Share of mw workers = workers at or below the 1967 mw. Estimates in col. (3) and (4) are for 1967 only.

 \rightarrow Estimated effects on earnings consistent with predicted effects.

Effect on earnings for white vs. black workers



| | (1) | (2) | $(3) = (1) \times (2)$ | (4) | |
|---|---|--------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| | Share of workers Avg increase at or below in earnings for the MW (%) MW workers (%) | | Predicted increase in earnings (%) | Estimated increase in earnings (%) | |
| All | 16.1 | 33.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 | |
| By education Low-education High-education | 31.1 9.6 | 32.7 34.2 | 10.2 3.3 | 10.1 2.5 | |
| <i>By race</i> Black White | 28.8 13.9 | 38.2 32.0 | 11.0 4.5 | 8.0 4.3 | |

Notes: same sample as in earnings regressions, in treated ind. in 1966. Share of mw workers = workers at or below the 1967 mw. Estimates in col. (3) and (4) are for 1967 only.


 \rightarrow Estimated effects on earnings consistent with predicted effects.

| | (1) | (2) | $(3) = (1) \times (2)$ | (4) |
|----------------|---|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Share of workers at or below the MW (%) | Avg increase in earnings for MW workers (%) | Predicted increase in earnings (%) | Estimated increase in earnings (%) |
| All | 16.1 | 33.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 |
| By education | | | | |
| Low-education | 31.1 | 32.7 | 10.2 | 10.1 |
| High-education | 9.6 | 34.2 | 3.3 | 2.5 |
| By race | | | | |
| Black | 28.8 | 38.2 | 11.0 | 8.0 |
| White | 13.9 | 32.0 | 4.5 | 4.3 |

Notes: same sample as in earnings regressions, in treated ind. in 1966. Share of mw workers = workers at or below the 1967 mw. Estimates in col. (3) and (4) are for 1967 only.

ightarrow Black workers twice as likely to be affected by the reform compared to white workers.

Adjusted White-Black Earnings Gap



→ Adjusted racial gap falls to zero in treated industries after the reform. ▶ By skill groups ▶ By gender ▶ Unadjusted

Effect of 1967 reform on employment

Empirical strategies to study employment effects

Aggregate evidence

- ► Cross industry difference-in-differences at state × year level

 Agg DinD
- ► No discontinuity in fraction of workers in treated and control industries around 1967. ►TC Shares
- No discontinuity in white vs. black shares within treated industries around 1967. ▶ Black Shares ▶ Aggregate shares

Micro-evidence

- Cross-state difference-in-differences (strongly vs. weakly treated states).
- "Bunching" (compare bunching at new min. wage to # workers below min wage pre-reform).

Cross-state design to study employment effects

Build min wage database by state, industry and gender:


- ▶ In 1965 31 states + D.C. had minimum wage laws.
- Variations in state coverage.

Sources: Report of the min wage study commission (1981) & Dept. of Labor Handbook on women workers (1965).

Use geographic variation in bite of reform


- ▶ Treatment group: workers in strongly treated states (no state minimum wage as of January 1966).
- Control group: workers in other states.

States with no min wage law as of January 1966



List of states with no min. wage as of 1966: Florida, Illinois, Texas, Alabama-Mississippi, North Carolina-South Carolina-Georgia, Kentucky-Tennessee, Iowa-North Dakota-South Dakota-Nebraska-Kansas-Minnesota-Missouri, Delaware-Maryland-Virgina-West Virginia, Arkansas-Louisiana-Oklahoma.

Impact on probability of being employed (vs. unemployed)



 \rightarrow Precise zero effect on employment.











Results on probability of employment

$$\begin{split} \forall \text{ period } k \in \text{[1961-1966], [1967-1972] \& [1973-1980],} \\ \mathbb{1}\{\text{emp}_{ist}\} &= \alpha + \delta_k + \sum_k \beta_k \text{Strongly}_s \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}_{ist}' \Gamma + \delta_s + \varepsilon_{ist} \end{split}$$

| | All | Black | White |
|--|----------|----------|----------|
| Strongly treated states \times 1967-1972 | | | |
| Employment | -0.001 | -0.012 | -0.001 |
| | (0.002) | (0.009) | (0.002) |
| | 693,449 | 65,939 | 627,510 |
| Earnings | 0.040*** | 0.123*** | 0.025*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.025) | (0.008) |
| | 534,977 | 51,666 | 483,311 |
| Employment elasticity se | -0.03 | -0.10 | -0.04 |
| | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.10) |
| Controls Time FE State FE | Y | Y | Y |
| | Y | Y | Y |
| | Y | Y | Y |

 \rightarrow Can rule out employment elasticity wrt earnings < -0.1.





Results on probability of employment

$$\begin{split} \forall \text{ period } k \in \text{[1961-1966], [1967-1972] \& [1973-1980],} \\ \mathbb{1}\{\text{emp}_{ist}\} &= \alpha + \delta_k + \sum_k \beta_k \text{Strongly}_s \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}_{ist}' \Gamma + \delta_s + \varepsilon_{ist} \end{split}$$

| | All | Black | White |
|--|----------|----------|----------|
| Strongly treated states \times 1967-1972 | | | |
| Employment | -0.001 | -0.012 | -0.001 |
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| | (0.010) | (0.025) | (0.008) |
| | 534,977 | 51,666 | 483,311 |
| Employment elasticity | -0.03 | -0.10 | -0.04 |
| se | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.10) |
| Controls | Υ | Υ | Y |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| State FE | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| | | | |

 \rightarrow Precise zero effect **holds for black workers** (can rule out elasticities < -0.2). • Alternative designs

Bunching methodology


Build 1967 counterfactual distributions for treated industries:

▶ Inflate 1966 wage distributions by 1966-67 national income per capita growth rate (+ 4.4%).

Compare 1967 counterfactual–1967 evolution of # workers:


- Paid strictly below the min. wage ("missing jobs").
- At or slightly above the min. wage ("excess jobs").
- Identification assumption: absent reform, wages would have evolved acc. to national income per capita 1966-67 growth.
- \blacktriangleright Do it by treated industry \times regions available in BLS.
- ▶ Benchmark: spillover up to $1.15 \times MW$; sensitivity to other thresholds.

Case study: laundries in the South



 \rightarrow Small employment elasticity wrt avg wage of 0.03. •• CF details

Generalized bunching estimates: missing and excess jobs



- \rightarrow Small changes in low-wage employment by industry \times regions.
- → Holds even where bite of the reform is large.

 Robustness to 1.20 × MW

Generalized bunching estimates: elasticities (1/2)

| | Employment counts | Workers below \$1 | Black share | Emp. elasticity wrt average wage | |
|-----------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|----------|
| | | (Percent) | (Percent) | 1.15 ×MW | 1.20 ×MW |
| Laundries | | | | | |
| South | 142,358 | 0.33 | 0.38 | 0.02 | 0.16 |
| Midwest | 107,127 | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 0.34 |
| Northeast | 97,395 | 0.00 | 0.41 | 0.10 | 0.01 |
| West | 50,835 | 0.01 | 0.15 | -0.45 | -0.60 |
| Hotels | | | | | |
| South | 113,529 | 0.39 | 0.44 | -0.10 | -0.07 |
| Midwest | 83,277 | 0.11 | 0.30 | -0.11 | -0.07 |
| Northeast | 80,764 | 0.05 | 0.18 | n.a. | n.a. |
| West | 66,898 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.18 |

^{ightarrow} Small elasticities ightharpoonup, robust to spillover up to 1.20 imes MW.

 $[\]rightarrow$ Elast. not higher in groups where share of black workers is large.

Generalized bunching estimates: elasticities (2/2)

| | Employment counts | Workers below \$1 | Black share | • | lasticity age wage |
|----------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------|----------|-----------------------|
| | | (Percent) | (Percent) | 1.15 ×MW | 1.20 ×MW |
| Restaurants | | | | | |
| South | 271,757 | 0.35 | 0.27 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Midwest | 303,807 | 0.13 | 0.07 | -0.70 | 0.70 |
| Northeast | 250,141 | 0.04 | 0.14 | -0.22 | 0.76 |
| West | 185,977 | 0.03 | 0.05 | -0.63 | -0.36 |
| Nursing Homes | | | | | |
| South | 70,584 | 0.69 | 0.11 | 0.26 | 0.36 |
| Midwest | 110,199 | 0.32 | 0.06 | -0.48 | -0.59 |
| Northeast | 83,748 | 0.09 | 0.11 | -0.41 | -0.48 |
| West | 52,662 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.45 | 0.66 |
| All industries | | | | | |
| U.S. | 2,071,056 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.06 | -0.21 |

[→] Results are robust to alternative employment estimator using the BLS data. • Alternative

Potential explanations for small employment effects

Small overall employment effects

- Neoclassical model
 - \rightarrow Inelastic labor demand (e.g., complementarity between factors of production or tight labor markets in 1960s).
- Monopsony model
 - \rightarrow Positive employment effects.

Small disemployment effects among blacks

- Low white-black elasticity of substitution
 - → Can rule out elasticities of more than 0.02 WB elasticity
 - ightarrow Occupational segregation remained high from 1960-1980.

Effect of 1967 reform on economy-wide racial

earnings gap

Decomposition of racial gap (1/3)

$$G^{\mathsf{total}} = \underbrace{s_w^c G^c + s_w^t G^t}_{\mathsf{Within industry}} + \underbrace{G_b^{ct}(s_w^c - s_b^c)}_{\mathsf{Between industry}}$$

Earnings gaps:

- ▶ $G^{\text{total}} = \overline{\log \omega_w} \overline{\log \omega_b}$: racial gap for all industries.
- $ightharpoonup G^c$: racial gap in industries covered in 1938 (control).
- ▶ G^t : racial gap in industries covered in 1967 (treatment).
- $ightharpoonup G_b^{ct}$: Control-treatment earnings gap among black workers.

Decomposition of racial gap (2/3)

$$G^{\text{total}} = \underbrace{s_w^c G^c + s_w^t G^t}_{\text{Within industry}} + \underbrace{G_b^{ct}(s_w^c - s_b^c)}_{\text{Between industry}}$$

Share of workers:

- $ightharpoonup s_w^c$: share of white workers working in the control group.
- $ightharpoonup s_w^t$: share of white workers working in the treatment group.
- $s_w^c + s_w^t = s_b^c + s_b^t = 1$
- ▶ In 1980, $s_w^c =$ 64%; $s_w^t =$ 36%; and, $s_b^c =$ 56%; $s_b^t =$ 44%.


Decomposition of racial gap (3/3)

$$G^{\text{total}} = \underbrace{s_w^c G^c + s_w^t G^t}_{\text{Within industry}} + \underbrace{G_b^{ct}(s_w^c - s_b^c)}_{\text{Between industry}}$$

To calculate the **contribution of 1967 reform to decline in racial gap**, we assume:

- ▶ 1. G^t evolves as G^c after 1966.
- ▶ **2.** G_b^{ct} evolves as G_w^{ct} after 1966.
- ▶ **3.** s_w^c , s_w^t , s_b^c not affected by the reform.

1967 min wage reform \searrow racial gap by $\sim 20\%$



 \rightarrow Within-industry effect accounts for more than 80% of impact of reform on economy-wide racial gap.

What caused the decline in racial gap?

| Explanation | | Reference | Contribution | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|--------------|--|
| Supply | School quantity | Smith & Welch (1980) | 20% | |
| | School quality | Card & Krueger (1992) | 20% | |
| | Other factors | Heckman & Payner (1989) | 10% | |
| MW | | Derenoncourt & Montialoux (2018) | 20% | |
| Demand Anti-discr. policies | | Donohue & Heckman (1991) | 30% | |
| Total | | | 100% | |

 \rightarrow 1967 extension of min. wage had first-order effect on racial inequality (as large as improvements in relative school quality).

Conclusion & future research

Key findings:


- ▶ 1967 extension of min. wage translated into large wage increase but no large dis-emp. effects.
- ▶ It played a critical role in \(\sqrt{} \) racial earnings and income inequality.

Future research:

- ▶ Investigate **other contexts**: racial inequalities in US today, in Brazil, and inequalities btwn natives & immigrants in Europe.
- Study political economy of local min. wage changes in US.




White-Black Earnings Gap



ightarrow 1967 reform can explain **timing** of \searrow in racial earnings gap.



White-Black Earnings Gap: treated vs. control industries



 \rightarrow 1967 reform can explain magnitude of \searrow in racial earnings gap.



Workers characteristics, 1965-66

| | Control group | | Treatment group | | |
|---|---------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|--|
| | White | Black | White | Black | |
| Annual earnings (in \$2017) | 45,809 | 28,870 | 32,848 | 20,854 | |
| Age | 39.8 38.8 | | 39.9 | 39.0 | |
| <i>Gender</i> Male Female | 0.76 0.24 | 0.80 0.20 | 0.43 0.57 | 0.39 0.61 | |
| Education 11 yrs of schooling or less More than 11 yrs of schooling | 0.38 0.62 | 0.64 0.35 | 0.26 0.74 | 0.51 0.48 | |
| Region South Non-South | 0.26 0.74 | 0.44 0.56 | 0.26 0.74 | 0.56 0.44 | |
| Full-time/part-time status Full-time, full-year Part-time | 0.87 0.13 | 0.79 0.21 | 0.68 0.32 | 0.67 0.33 | |
| Observations | 24,636 | 2,035 | 8,685 | 1,544 | |

Sources: March CPS 1966-67. Sample: Adults 25-55, worked more than 13 weeks last year, worked more than 3 hours last week. CPI-U-RS used as deflator.




Employment and earnings by industry and by race, 1967

| | Employment | | Employment shares | | Earnings (\$2017) | |
|---------------------------------|------------|---------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|--------|
| | Number | Percent | White | Black | White | Black |
| All industries | 38,490,848 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.11 | 42,575 | 24,522 |
| Industries covered by 1938 FLSA | 20,663,098 | 0.54 | 0.92 | 0.08 | 46,469 | 29,174 |
| Industries covered by 1961 FLSA | 6,336,330 | 0.16 | 0.92 | 0.08 | 39,854 | 23,701 |
| Retail trade | 3,961,711 | 0.10 | 0.93 | 0.07 | 35,438 | 24,463 |
| Construction | 2,374,619 | 0.06 | 0.89 | 0.11 | 47,520 | 22,868 |
| Industries covered by 1966 FLSA | 7,962,920 | 0.21 | 0.86 | 0.14 | 33,435 | 21,405 |
| Schools | 2,913,630 | 0.08 | 0.90 | 0.10 | 38,560 | 30,513 |
| Nursing homes | 1,419,030 | 0.04 | 0.91 | 0.09 | 37,928 | 23,684 |
| Hospitals | 1,260,220 | 0.03 | 0.79 | 0.21 | 27,767 | 20,939 |
| Hotels & laundries | 741,447 | 0.02 | 0.76 | 0.24 | 25,581 | 16,667 |
| Restaurants | 777,805 | 0.02 | 0.86 | 0.14 | 22,344 | 15,777 |
| Agriculture | 599,313 | 0.02 | 0.75 | 0.25 | 24,406 | 11,685 |
| Entertainment | 251,475 | 0.01 | 0.87 | 0.13 | 44,099 | 22,524 |
| Public Administration | 2,848,719 | 0.07 | 0.87 | 0.13 | 46,944 | 35,436 |
| Domestic service | 679,782 | 0.02 | 0.31 | 0.69 | 10,054 | 8,381 |

Source: 1967 March CPS. Sample: Adults 25-55, black or white, worked more than 13 weeks last year, worked more than 3 hours last week, not self-employed, not in the armed forces. Industries covered by 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and subsequent amendments (1961 and 1966 amendments).




Black shares in total black employment, by industry






The Fair Labor Standards Act (1938-2017), \$2017



Note: Minimum wage series deflated using CPI-U-RS (\$ 2017). Back




Minimum wage to median ratio and Kaitz index





Effect of 1967 extension of min. wage on annual earnings



- \rightarrow Similar point estimates with and without controls.
- \rightarrow Sorting on observables not part of response to '67 reform.




Effect of 1967 extension of min. wage on annual earnings




- \rightarrow No effect on intensive margin in the short-run.
- \rightarrow Slight \searrow in nb hours and weeks worked post-1975.

Effect on earnings for high- vs. low-education workers among blacks



 $\rightarrow \mbox{ Effect } \mbox{ concentrated among low-education workers}.$

Effect on earnings for high- vs. low-education workers among whites



 $\rightarrow \mbox{ Effect } \mbox{ concentrated among low-education workers}.$

Effect on hourly wages using BLS data

$$\begin{subarray}{l} \textbf{Model 1}: & y_{jrt} = \alpha + \beta_1 \mathsf{Covered 1967}_j \times \mathsf{Post}_t + \nu_j + \eta_r + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{jrt} \\ \textbf{Model 2}: & y_{jrt} = \alpha + \beta_1 \mathsf{Covered 1967}_j \times \mathsf{Post}_t \times \mathsf{South}_r + \beta_2 \mathsf{Covered 1967}_j \times \\ \mathsf{Post}_t + \beta_3 \mathsf{Post}_t \times \mathsf{South}_r + \beta_4 \mathsf{Covered 1967}_j \times \mathsf{South}_r + \nu_j + \eta_r + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{jrt} \\ \end{subarray}$$

| | Мо | del 1 | Model 2 | | |
|--------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|--|
| | Full sample | Strict sample | Full sample | Strict sample | |
| Covered in 1967 \times | | | | | |
| 1967-1969 | 0.083*** | 0.117*** | 0.066** | 0.098*** | |
| | (0.025) | (0.032) | (0.025) | (0.034) | |
| 1967-1969 \times South | | | 0.075*** | 0.081** | |
| | | | (0.018) | (0.040) | |
| Observations | 337 | 194 | 337 | 194 | |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | |
| Industry FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | |
| Region FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | |

 \rightarrow Consistent (although a bit higher) with effects on annual earnings in CPS.




Effect on earnings in strongly vs. weakly treated states

$$\begin{split} \forall \text{ period } k \in \text{[1961-1966], [1967-1972] \& [1973-1980],} \\ \log w_{ist} &= \alpha + \mathsf{Strongly}_s + \sum_k \beta_k \mathsf{Strongly}_s \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}_{ist}' \Gamma + \delta_s + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ist} \end{split}$$

| | All | Treated | Control |
|----------------------------------|----------|---------|----------|
| Strongly treated states \times | | | |
| 1967-1972 | 0.040*** | 0.067** | 0.030*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.024) | (0.007) |
| Observations | 534,977 | 134,896 | 272,896 |
| Controls | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| State FE | Υ | Υ | Υ |

- \rightarrow Wage effect in 1967 industries (+6.7%) > 1938 ind. (+3%).
- \rightarrow 1966 share of workers \leq \$1 larger in strongly (11.2%) than in weakly treated states (5.7%). Back to wages Back to emp.

Effect on earnings for white and black workers






Effect on earnings for white and black workers

| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | |
|--------------------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Black | White | Black | White | Black | White |
| Covered in 1967 \times | | | | | | |
| 1967-1972 | 0.095*** | 0.054** | 0.074*** | 0.051** | 0.074** | 0.048** |
| | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.023) | (0.030) | (0.022) |
| 1973-1980 | 0.078* | 0.036 | 0.049 | 0.033 | 0.043 | 0.035 |
| | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.039) | (0.041) | (0.043) | (0.041) |
| Observations | 37,770 | 370,053 | 37,770 | 370,053 | 36,895 | 370,053 |
| Controls | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Industry FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| State FE | N | N | Υ | Υ | N | N |
| State-by-year FE | N | N | N | N | Y | Υ |




Adjusted White-Black Earnings Gap within treated industries





Adjusted White-Black Earnings Gap within control industries






Effect on racial gap driven by reduced gap among men

| | All | Women | Men |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Covered in 1967 $	imes$ | | | |
| 1967-1972 | -0.076 | -0.043 | -0.085 |
| | (0.043) | (0.036) | (0.065) |
| Observations | 407,823 | 157,510 | 250,313 |
| Controls | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Industry FE | Υ | Υ | Υ |

Notes: Adults 25-55, worked more than 13 weeks last year, worked more than 3 hours last week. Standard errors clustered at the industry level.




Unadjusted White-Black Earnings Gap




 \rightarrow Unadjusted racial gap falls to $\sim 15\%$ in treated industries after the reform. $\bullet^{\rm Back}$

Employment shares by industry type




Source: March CPS 1962-1981. Pack

Black employment shares (vs. White) by industry type



Source: March CPS 1962-1981. Back

Black & White employment shares by industry type




Source: March CPS 1962-1981. Back

Employment effects using cross-industry design

| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Covered in 1967 \times 1967-1972 | | | |
| Earnings | 0.078** (0.031) | 0.073** (0.033) | 0.074** (0.033) |
| Employment | -0.003 (0.007) | -0.005 (0.007) | -0.005 (0.007) |
| Emp. elasticity | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.06 |
| se | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| lower bound | -0.26 | -0.29 | -0.29 |
| upper bound | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.16 |
| Industry-by-State-Year Obs | 6,090 | 6,090 | 6,090 |
| Has Controls | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Has Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Has Industry FE | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Has State FE | N | Υ | N |
| Has State-by-year FE | N | N | Y |


Source: March CPS 1962-1981. Back

Black emp. shares by industry in total black emp.




Source: March CPS 1962-1981. Total employment defined here as employment in industries covered in 1938 and industries covered in 1967 combined.

White emp. shares by industry in total white emp.




Source: March CPS 1962-1981. Total employment defined here as employment in industries covered in 1938 and industries covered in 1967 combined. Back

Impact on employment, by race






Impact on employment, by education






Impact on employment, by gender



Impact on employment, across cohorts



Results on probability of employment (vs. unemp./NILF)


$$\begin{split} \forall \text{ period } k \in \text{[1961-1966], [1967-1972] \& [1973-1980],} \\ \mathbb{1}\{\text{emp}_{ist}\} &= \alpha + \delta_k + \sum_k \beta_k \text{Strongly}_s \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}'_{ist}\Gamma + \delta_s + \varepsilon_{ist} \end{split}$$

| | All | Black | White |
|--|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Strongly treated states \times 1967-1972 | | | |
| Employment | 0.002 (0.004) 944,981 | 0.007 (0.011) 88,763 | 0.003 (0.005) 856,218 |
| Earnings | 0.040*** (0.010) 534,977 | 0.123*** (0.025) 51,666 | 0.025*** (0.008) 483,311 |
| Employment elasticity se | 0.06 (0.16) | 0.09 (0.13) | 0.15 (0.26) |
| Controls | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| State FE | Y | Y | Y |
| | | | |

 \rightarrow Can rule out employment elasticity wrt earnings < -0.1.



Employment elasticities in the literature and in this paper






Employment results using alternative cross-state designs

$$\begin{split} \forall \text{ period } k \in \text{[1961-1966], [1967-1972] \& [1973-1980],} \\ \mathbb{1}\{\text{emp}_{ist}\} = \alpha + \delta_k + \sum_k \beta_k \text{Treat. } \text{var.}_s \times \delta_{t+k} + \mathbb{X}'_{ist}\Gamma + \delta_s + \varepsilon_{ist} \end{split}$$

| | Alternative design #1 Kaitz index | | Alternative design #2 Fraction of affected workers | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | All | Black | White | All | Black | White |
| Treatment var. \times 1967-1972 | | | | | | |
| Employment | -0.001 (0.001) 693,088 | -0.008* (0.004) 65,851 | -0.000 (0.001) 627,237 | -0.001 (0.001) 693,088 | -0.010** (0.004) 65,851 | 0.000 (0.001) 627,237 |
| Earnings | 0.014*** (0.005) 534,798 | 0.051*** (0.013) 51,615 | 0.006 (0.004) 483,183 | 0.022*** (0.004) 534,798 | 0.064*** (0.012) 51,615 | 0.012*** (0.004) 483,183 |
| Employment elasticity se | -0.09 (0.07) | -0.16** (0.08) | -0.09 (0.19) | -0.03 (0.05) | -0.17** (0.06) | 0.01 (0.10) |
| Controls | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| Time FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |
| State FE | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ | Υ |

 $[\]rightarrow$ Can rule out elasticities < -0.24 for blacks. Pack


Simulation of 1967 counterfactual in laundries South



- → Simulate indiv. level data (uniform distrib. within bins).
- \rightarrow Inflate wages & collapse back into original bins.



Generalized bunching estimates at $1.20 \times MW$



- \rightarrow Slightly more > 0 emp. elasticity overall than 1.15 \times MW.
- \rightarrow Heterogeneity across regions > across industries.



Employment elasticity wrt avg wage formula

Emp. elasticity wrt avg wage =
$$\frac{\Delta e}{\Delta w} = \frac{\Delta a + \Delta b}{\Delta w}$$

- ► Change in low-wage employment $\Delta e = \Delta a + \Delta b$
- ▶ Missing jobs $\Delta a = \mathsf{Emp}^1[w < \mathsf{MW}] \mathsf{Emp}^0[w < \mathsf{MW}]$
- $\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{ Excess\ jobs\ } \Delta b \\ = \mathrm{Emp}^1[MW \leq w < \bar{\mathrm{W}}] \mathrm{Emp}^0[MW \leq w < \bar{\mathrm{W}}] \end{array}$

 ${\rm Emp}^1$ (Emp 0) are # workers in 67 obs. (counterf.) distrib. $\Delta e,~\Delta a$ and Δb measured relative to 1966 employment.

▶ Change in average wages Δw 1967 counterf.—1967 % change in avg wages in entire distrib.



Alternative employment estimator using the BLS data

Compare 1966–1967 evolution of number of workers:


- Around minimum wage (affected by 1967 reform).
- Higher up in distribution (not affected by 1967 reform).
- ▶ Identification assumption: absent reform, # people employed at bottom of distrib. would have evolved as # employed at top.
- Checked no boom in low-wage emp. in control industries.

Benchmark assumption:


- ▶ Spillover up to 1.15 times minimum wage.
- Sensitivity analysis in robustness tests.




Hourly wage distribution in laundries in South



Hourly wage distribution in laundries in South



Hourly wage distribution in laundries in South



Generalized estimates

| | Threshold for bottom | | |
|--|----------------------|---------|--|
| Laundries, South | $1 \times MW$ | 1.15×MW | |
| Employment 1966-67 change, bottom (%) | 2.8 | 1.0 | |
| 1966-67 change, top [\$1.30+] (%) Average hourly wages | 1.0 | 1.0 | |
| 1966-67 change (%) | 27.06 | 18.2 | |
| Employment Elasticity | 0.06 | 0.00 | |
| All industries, U.S. Employment | 1.15×MW | 1.20×MW | |
| 1966-67 change, bottom (%) | 2.2 | -1.3 | |
| 1966-67 change, top [\$1.70+] (%) | 8.0 | 8.0 | |
| Average hourly wages | | | |
| 1966-67 change (%) | 8.73 | 7.36 | |
| Employment Elasticity | 0.16 | -0.28 | |

Generalized estimates

| | Threshold for bottom | | |
|---|----------------------|---------------|--|
| Laundries, South Employment | 1×MW | 1.15×MW | |
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Generalized estimates

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| Average hourly wages | | | | |
| 1966-67 change (%) | 8.73 | 7.36 | | |
| Employment Elasticity | 0.16 | -0.28 | | |

White-black elasticity of substitution

| | Baseline cross-state design | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|--|--|
| | All Men | | Women | | | |
| Strongly treated state \times 1967-1972 | | | | | | |
| Relative W/B shares of workers | 0.010** (0.004) 662,539 | 0.010* (0.005) 410,128 | 0.011* (0.006) 252,411 | | | |
| Relative W/B earnings | -0.089*** (0.026) 534,977 | -0.091*** (0.032) 336,099 | -0.092*** (0.026) 198,878 | | | |
| L-L elast. (emp. shares) se lower bound upper bound | 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 0.02 | 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 0.02 | 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 0.03 | | | |


 $[\]rightarrow$ Can rule out elasticities of more than 0.02 for men, and 0.03 for women. \bigcirc Back

Occupational segregation

| | Census 1960 | | | | Census 1980 | | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Control | | Treatment | | Control | | Treatment | |
| | White | Black | White | Black | White | Black | White | Black |
| Operatives | 0.91 | 0.09 | 0.67 | 0.33 | 0.85 | 0.15 | 0.80 | 0.20 |
| Craftsmen | 0.97 | 0.03 | 0.92 | 0.08 | 0.92 | 0.08 | 0.90 | 0.10 |
| Clerical and kindred | 0.98 | 0.02 | 0.95 | 0.05 | 0.91 | 0.09 | 0.89 | 0.11 |
| Managers, officials and proprietors | 0.99 | 0.01 | 0.97 | 0.03 | 0.97 | 0.03 | 0.93 | 0.07 |
| Professional, Technical | 0.99 | 0.01 | 0.93 | 0.07 | 0.95 | 0.05 | 0.91 | 0.09 |
| Sales workers | 0.99 | 0.01 | 0.97 | 0.03 | 0.96 | 0.04 | 0.95 | 0.05 |
| Service workers Waiters and waitresses Cooks, except private household | 0.45 0.63 0.62 | 0.55 0.37 0.38 | 0.58 0.92 0.73 | 0.42 0.08 0.27 | 0.78 0.84 0.72 | 0.22 0.16 0.28 | 0.80 0.95 0.79 | 0.20 0.05 0.21 |
| Laborers and farmers | 0.73 | 0.27 | 0.74 | 0.26 | 0.81 | 0.19 | 0.86 | 0.14 |
| Total | 0.93 | 0.07 | 0.86 | 0.14 | 0.90 | 0.10 | 0.88 | 0.12 |


 \rightarrow "Front" vs. "back-of the house" jobs: 8% (5%) of waiters are black vs. 27% (21%) of cooks in 1960 (1980).

Earnings distribution in laundries in Northeast




 \rightarrow Min. wage in NY state: \$1.25 (1963 &1966), \$1.50 (1967), \$1.60 (1968). \bullet Back

Earnings distribution in laundries in West




 \rightarrow Min. wage in California: \$1.25 (1963 &1966), \$1.40 (1967), \$1.65 (1968). \bullet Back

Earnings distribution in laundries in Midwest




 \rightarrow Min. wage in Ohio: \$0.8 (1963), \$0.9 (1966), \$0.8 (1967 & 1968); no min. wage in Illinois. Pack

Earnings distribution in hotels (non-tipped) in South






Earnings distribution in restaurants (non-tipped) in South




Note: small establishments (i.e. with annual sales below \$500K) aren't covered by the min. wage in 1967. Back

Earnings distribution in nursing homes in South




Earnings distribution in schools in South





Map of state groups in early CPS files



Note: In March CPS 1963-76, some states are grouped together. We use this categorization of 21 state groups in our analysis. For example: California, Connecticut, New York State, Florida, and Indiana have their own state identifier in March CPS 1962-1981. Arkansas, Louisiana and Oklahoma are grouped together. State grouped together are geographically close, and similar in terms of state min. wage legislation.



Digitized BLS Industry wage reports

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Candy and Other Confectionary Products Cigars Communications Cotton textiles Eating and Drinking Places Electric and Gas Utilities: Physical Workers Fabricated Structural Steel Fertilizer Manufacturing Flour and Grain Mill Hosierv Hospitals Hotels and Motels Iron and Steel Foundries Laundries Leather Tanning Meat Products Men's and Boy's Suits and Coats Men's and Women's Footwear Men's and Boys' Shirts Miscellaneous Plastic Products Motor Vehicle Parts Movie Theaters Nonferrous Foundries Nursing Homes Paints and Vamishes Paperboard Containers and Boxes Pressed or Brown Glass and Glassware Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills Schools Southern Sawmills Structural Clay Synthetic Fibers Textile Mills and Textile Dyeing and Finishing West Coast Sawmilling and Logging Women's and Misses' Coats and Suits Women's and Misses' Dresses Wood Household Furniture Wool Textiles Work Clothing

Covered in 1938 Covered in 1967

